In a recent case before the United States District Court, the defendant was sentenced on all counts. The government moved for restitution under the Mandatory Victim’s Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA). The defendant filed an objection to the government’s request for restitution.

The court, in its decision, indicated that the purpose of the MVRA is to make victims whole, stating that in each order of restitution, the court shall order restitution to each victim in the full amount of each victim’s losses as determined by the court and without consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant.

The court stated that restitution is serious business, but hearings to qualify restitution amounts should not be allowed to spawn mini trials. We do not expect a sentencing court to undertake a full-blown trial in order to arrive at an appropriate restitution amount, nor do we hold a sentencing court to a standard of absolute decision when fashioning restitution orders. In the end, we will uphold a sentencing court’s restitution award as long as the court’s order reasonably responds to some reliable evidence.

A sentencing court’s mere guesswork will not suffice. Similarly, rough approximations that do not sufficiently reflect the lawsuits of the victims are not appropriate grist for the restitution mill. The court must resolve any genuine and material disputes about the fact, caused, or amount of the loss by a preponderance of the evidence.

In the case at hand, the court pointed out that the government sought $5,500 in total restitution to the two victims of the defendant’s crimes, which included $5,000 spent by the victims for home security measures after they were threatened by the defendant. The defendant objected to the government’s request on the basis that (1) the government “fails to support its requests with any evidence whatsoever,” and (2) the “costs associated with home security are not properly covered by the MVRA.”

The court pointed out that as to the compensation requested as compensation for home security measures, it is not clear to the court that these damages are compensable under the MVRA, pointing out that although the government did not specify the basis for its request, the court assumed that the government’s motion was grounded in 18 U.S.C. Section 3663 (b)(4), which provides for reimbursement in all cases where the MVRA applies “for lost income and necessary childcare, transportation, and other expenses,” provided that such expenses are “related to participation in the investigation or prosecution of the offense or attendance at proceedings related to the offense.”

The court pointed out that the government’s argument appeared to be that the home security measures are compensable because they are a direct and proximate result of the defendant’s criminal threats.

Notwithstanding, the court pointed out that without more from the government to establish how these expenses were necessary to the investigation or prosecution of the offense within the meaning of MVRA, the court declined to extend the statute to encompass these costs.

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